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Abstract 
This paper studies an early participatory rural development program implemented during the 
1930s in Japan. This program selected several villages each year to draft and implement their 
own original development plans. I discuss the implications of the features of the program on its 
effectiveness. A detailed baseline survey conducted by the villagers themselves helped them to 
objectively diagnose their economic situations and understand their issues. The plans defined 
clear numerical targets, allowing them to share goals and monitor progress. The implementation 
of the plan was reinforced by frequent communication and monitoring among neighbors and by 
an incentive scheme that involved competition within a village. I use a village-level panel 
dataset from the Hyogo prefecture to examine the effects, under the difference-in-differences 
strategy. I find suggestive evidence that the program helped foster the adoption of cattle raising 
and diversify agricultural production. 
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1.  Introduction 
Improving livelihoods in the rural sector is a premise of economic development and 
social stability. The rural sector plays a vital role in a country’s economy by supplying food and 
labor for the industrial sector. Once rural incomes begin to rise, the rural population also serves 
as a driver of industrialization by demanding industrial products. Therefore, many countries put 
considerable effort into promoting social and economic development in rural areas, often by 
conducting various rural development programs. In conducting such programs, recent 
interventions are placing considerable emphasis on the participation and empowerment of 
beneficiary communities (World Bank, 2005; Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt, and Spector, 2010).   
This paper studies a policy introduced in Japan during the 1930s, which was probably 
the earliest, nation-wide, participatory rural development program
2. The program, namely, the 
Economic Rehabilitation Movement (ERM) (keizai kosei undo), aimed at helping the recovery 
of rural villages that was seriously damaged by the Great Depression. It was a thorough 
bottom-up, participatory program in which the selected villages were responsible for drafting 
and implementing their own original development plans. The program also had a number of 
unique features that seemed to improve its effectiveness. This case provides useful insights into 
how Japan responded to an unprecedented depression, how the policy was intended to involve 
community initiatives, and how well it worked in aiding in the recovery. 
The purpose of this paper is to re-evaluate the ERM as a rural development program and 
to examine its effect quantitatively. To this end, I first describe the features of the ERM as a 
participatory development program and discuss how some of its features might have served to 
enhance the effectiveness of the program. I then use a village-level panel dataset from the 
Hyogo prefecture from the years 1930, 1935, and 1940 in order to analyze the effects of the 
ERM. The data span over the periods before and after the introduction of the program, which 
allows me to use a difference-in-differences strategy to evaluate the impact. 
Previous studies of the ERM are mostly historical and have focused much on its political 
and ideological aspects
3. A common understanding is that the movement formed a basis for 
fascism by organizing rural communities to supply food and troops for the state, in the name of 
                                                      
2  According to Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt, and Spector (2010), Bangladesh and India first 
implemented programs that advanced community roles, in the 1940s. The implementation of the 
ERM in Japan started in 1932.   
3  For a review of historical ERM studies, see Takahashi (1997). 3 
 
rural rehabilitation and relief (Takahashi, 1997). On the other hand, little is known regarding the 
economic effects of the ERM. Only a few descriptive studies examine the ERM from the 
perspective of economic and rural development policy (e.g., Godo, 1995; Hatta, 1996; Okada, 
1989). The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF; 1933, 1935, 1936, and 1938) and some 
prefecture governments published reports that introduced some “best practice” cases; although 
these reports are informative in that they allow us to know how the movement was implemented 
and what the plans were like, their appraisals of “success” tend to be self-serving. Given that the 
majority of the villages received only a trivial subsidy, previous studies have claimed that the 
ERM had no tangible economic effect and have ended up as merely an ideological movement 
with an empty slogan without any appropriate quantitative evaluation (Inoue 1957, Mori 1998). 
This paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first examination of the effect of the ERM, based 
on the comparisons of the outcomes of those villages selected to participate in the program and 
those that were not
4.  
I find that the villages selected for the ERM were successful in terms of two key 
recovery strategies: the diversification of agricultural production and the introduction of cattle 
raising. Indeed, some subgroups of the participating villages increased the percentage of 
cattle-raising farm households by approximately 5.7–6.5%, and their agricultural diversification 
index values increased by 2.8%. I also obtained suggestive evidence that participation in the 
ERM was beneficial in terms of income improvement and debt reduction. The empirical results 
suggest that the ERM had some real effects on the rural economy, beyond the political and 
ideological, despite the lack of financial support.   
I argue that some of the unique features of the ERM were keys to the effectiveness of the 
program. For example, participating villages were required to conduct a detailed baseline 
household survey. This was indispensable for the villagers in objectively diagnosing their 
current economic situations and finding appropriate solutions for the issues they faced. The 
plans defined clear numerical targets, and the villagers were able to share and monitor their 
progress. The actual implementation of the plan was borne by small implementation groups 
consisting of closely related neighbors who could frequently communicate with and monitor 
each other. The ERM’s execution was reinforced by holding a competition among the 
                                                      
4  The exception is Kamiya (1937), which compares population growth between the selected and 
non-selected villages.   4 
 
communities in terms of the achievement of planned goals. These organizational and incentive 
structures of the program also seemed to have certain implications on the actual implementation 
of the plans.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the ERM in the Hyogo prefecture. I discuss in detail the features of the program and their 
implications on the ERM’s effectiveness in detail. Section 3 presents the data and measurement 
strategy. Section 4 examines the determinants for the selection to the program. Section 5 
analyzes the effect of the program and discusses some concerns on the over-estimation of the 
effect. I conclude with Section 6.   
 
2.  The Economic Rehabilitation Movement   
2.1.  Overview  
The ERM was introduced in 1932 as a relief policy against the Great Depression, which 
began in October 1929. Rural economies were hit by drastic price drops in main agricultural 
produce, especially rice and cocoons. Accordingly, farmers’ debt was believed to have reached 
an amount that was nearly twice the average household’s annual income. In August 1932, the 
63
rd Extraordinary Imperial Diet Session, referred to as the “rural relief diet,” was held; a budget 
for the ERM was passed, along with public relief projects and price supports for rice. 
The goal of the ERM was to support rural villages in their recovery from economic 
downturn, by improving income, reducing the costs of living and production, and liquidating 
accumulated debts. The essence of the ERM was to prompt villages to draft and implement their 
own rehabilitation plans. In each prefecture, several villages were selected every year as 
“rehabilitation villages” (kosei-son). Each of the selected villages was required to establish an 
economic rehabilitation committee, conduct a baseline survey, diagnose its situation, and 
establish its own economic rehabilitation plans. Upon selection, each village was granted a 
one-time subsidy of 100 yen
5. However, this subsidy was negligible
6. In order to assist villages 
that lacked the budget to implement their plans, the Special Subsidy Program (SSP; tokubetsu 
josei) began from 1936, and it granted substantial subsidies amounting to an average of 15,000 
yen per village. Therefore, the ERM had two pillars: the planning of a rehabilitation plan and 
                                                      
5  In Hyogo prefecture, the subsidy was 200 yen per village. 
6  By way of comparison, the annual income of a farm household at that same time was 
approximately 500 yen. 5 
 
disbursement of a special subsidy. Overall, the selection for planning began in 1932 and ended 
in 1940. A total of 9,149 villages (i.e., 83% of all the villages in the country) had been selected. 
The SSP began in 1936 and ended in 1941, aiding 1,595 villages (i.e., 17% of the villages) that 
had been selected for planning.   
Figure 1 depicts the administrative procedure of the ERM in Hyogo prefecture (Hyogo 
Prefecture, 1938). In Hyogo, the prefectural ERM committee selected up to 40 villages each 
year, except for in 1932, in which 20 villages were selected. The application was voluntary and 
the villages willing to be selected were required to submit action and budget plans to the 
governor. Unfortunately, the criteria for the selection of “rehabilitation villages” are not clear. I 
examine the possible determinants of selection in Section 4. On the other hand, the eligibility 
criteria for receiving a special subsidy were very clear: a village was required to (1) have 
already established a rehabilitation plan at least one year in advance, (2) have a shortage of 
funds in implementing its plan, and (3) have a strong leader (chushin jinbutsu). 
 
2.2.  Features of the Economic Rehabilitation Movement 
I discuss three features of the ERM that make it unique as a rural development program, 
and which seem to enhance the effectiveness of the program.   
First, the ERM was a thorough participatory, bottom-up program
7. The guiding principle 
of the ERM was self-help: the villages were required to recover on their own through “mutual 
help among residents.” The villages were responsible throughout the entire process for 
conducting the baseline survey, and drafting and implementing the rehabilitation plan. In this 
respect, the movement shares the same key idea that is part of today’s participatory development 
programs. For example, the World Bank’s community-driven development (CDD) programs 
emphasize beneficiary participation and give local communities control over project planning 
and decision-making (Mansuri and Rao, 2004; World Bank, 2005)
8. The ERM is also similar to 
                                                      
7  We should note, however, that the MAF and prefecture governments provided a format and 
guidance for the content of the baseline surveys and rehabilitation plans (Hiraga, 2003: ch.3; 
Yasutomi, 1994: ch.5). There are also indications that because village officials lacked the 
knowledge and experience needed to draft such plans, some had merely been copied from the 
prototype. Thus, some villages may have had only limited freedom in drafting their respective 
plans. 
8  The motive for promoting beneficiary participation, however, seems to differ between the 
ERM and CDD. The CDD programs delegate control to the local communities, in order to 6 
 
the CDD in its use of inter-village competition for funding. A typical implementation of CDD 
projects consists of a limited amount of social funds for which communities can apply by 
submitting a proposal for a small-scale development program. From these applications, a few 
are selected to receive funds (Jack, 2001; Rawlings, Sherburne-Benz, and Van Domelen, 2004). 
This competitive structure may motivate applicants to improve their proposals. The ERM 
featured a similar competition structure, and only a few villages were selected each year.   
The second feature of the ERM was the requirement that an applicant village conduct its 
own baseline survey. The survey seemed to be effective in enabling villagers to objectively 
understand their economic situation. The contents of these surveys were similar to a typical 
survey that a development economist would carry out today. It covered topics such as the labor 
situations (the situation of those hiring and hired, seasonal shortages and surpluses of labor), the 
use of agricultural inputs (use of self-supplied fertilizer and purchased fertilizer), agricultural 
production and sales, and financial status (debt and savings)
9. The survey was detailed and 
structured. For example, the labor module of the questionnaire asked monthly information of 
number of workers required for each crop and how it was managed (i.e., by family labor or 
hired labor). In this way, villages were able to clarify the seasonal fluctuations in their labor 
shortages and surpluses
10. The financial status module was similar to an income/expenditure 
module of a typical household survey questionnaire. With information regarding the amounts of 
each income and expenditure items, many rehabilitation plans set a target amount on the 
reduction of redundant expenditures, such as ceremonial expenses
11.  
The third feature of the ERM was the organizational and incentive structures that were 
used to implement the rehabilitation plan. A critical organizational feature was that although the 
                                                                                                                                                            
enhance ownership, elicit local needs, and improve the targeting of beneficiaries (Mansuri and 
Rao, 2004). On the other hand, the ERM’s self-help principle was based on the policymakers’ 
recognition that the villages were relying excessively on the government (Kodaira, 1932).   
9  The survey content was laid down in the format provided by the MAF; the Hyogo prefecture 
provided a sample form that the survey participants could fill in. 
10  For example, the survey of Shijimi village in Mino County revealed that the only month with 
a labor shortage was November (i.e., the harvesting season) (Hyogo Prefecture, 1937a). Labor 
surpluses, on the other hand, were at their peak in September, amounting to over 33,000 
man-days of idle workforce. 
11  Kitatani village in Mino County defined target percentages for expenditure cuts: 5% cuts to 
current expenditures and 40% reduction in extra expenses, such as those pertaining to 
ceremonies (Hyogo Prefecture, 1937a). 7 
 
plan was drafted at the village level, its actual execution was borne by small implementation 
groups at a lower, community level (i.e., a village was comprised of several communities). 
Since a community consisted of smaller numbers of closely related neighbors, this 
organizational structure was effective in fostering frequent communication and regular 
monitoring of progress. This structure was also suitable for providing incentives to implement 
the plan; many villages held a competition where the communities within the village competed 
in terms of plan achievements
12.  
 
2.3.  Strategies for rehabilitation 
I now turn to discuss the contents of the rehabilitation plans. Recall that the main 
objective of the ERM was to foster recovery from the Great Depression by improving income 
and reducing accumulated debt. In this context, the following question arises: what kind of 
strategies did the villages develop to achieve this goal? In order to consider the possible options 
for raising farmer incomes, note that it is necessary to increase at least one of the following 
three income components: farm income from main crops, farm income from subsidiary crops, 
and non-farm income. Among these, the only realistic option was to increase the subsidiary 
farm income, given that the price of the two main crops (i.e., rice and cocoons) had bottomed 
out, and that the non-agricultural economy had also been hit by the Great Depression.   
Under such circumstances, it is no wonder that many villages focused on the 
diversification in agricultural production, adoption of animal husbandry, and introduction of 
side jobs such as handicraft production or small-scale manufacturing
13. Note that these are 
                                                      
12  The example of Yamada village in Kanzaki County is informative (Hyogo Prefecture, 1937a). 
This village planned to recover by increasing its production of rush mats. In order to stimulate 
production, the village periodically held a competition among communities with respect to their 
sales volumes, wherein awards were given to the top three communities. The village also 
awarded the community that saw the greatest increase in production since the previous 
competition, in order to encourage low-performance communities to improve.   
13  Other major plan contents included: the use of village agricultural cooperatives for the 
collective purchase of inputs and sale of produce, lifestyle improvements (e.g., promotion of 
savings, book-keeping, self-production of daily goods, reductions in ceremonial expenses, the 
joint use of instruments and equipment, improvements in hygiene and disaster prevention, and 
the fostering of mutual relief), and debt liquidation (e.g., setting a debt recourse plan and 
establishing a debt-liquidation association). The MAF also strongly required the incorporation 
of ethical reclamation that supported certain ideologies, such as respect for ancestors, prudence, 
solidarity, social contributions, and mutual help; it is perhaps for this reason that historical 8 
 
standard means of improving rural income, even today (which implies that there is no “magic 
bullet”)
14. In fact, production diversification and introduction of side jobs were feasible, given 
that the baseline surveys had revealed that the seasonal surplus labor in the slack season was 
substantial. Introducing an additional crop was expected to make the best use of idle labor and 
generate additional income. Furthermore, the MAF promoted the raising of livestock to 
introduce animal power into plowing, reduce production costs by replacing purchased fertilizer 
with manure, and raise profits from selling the livestock itself.   
The selected villages were required to write down the quantitative goals of each 
component of the rehabilitation strategy in the plan (e.g., the target acreage of each crop and 
number of livestock). With these explicit targets, the villagers were able to share the goals and 
objectively monitor their progress.   
 
3.  Effects of the ERM 
This section examines the economic effects of the ERM. I first describe the data. Then I 
discuss the determinants of program participation (i.e., selection). Finally, I examine the effects 
on household income and diversification in agricultural production.   
 
3.1.  Data 
I use village-level data from the Annual Statistics of the Hyogo Prefecture and the 
National Census for 1930, 1935, and 1940. Figure 2 describes the sample. In Hyogo, the 
selection of villages for planning (i.e., establishing the rehabilitation plan) started in 1932 and 
ended in 1938. Of 385 villages,
15 84 were selected in period 1 (1930–1934) of my dataset, 
which I refer to as PLAN1. Of the remaining 301 non-PLAN1 villages, 144 were selected 
during period 2 (1935–1949), which I refer to as PLAN2. Selection for SSP started in 1936 and 
ended in 1941. Of 84 PLAN1 villages, 26 were selected for SSP during period 2. Five PLAN2 
                                                                                                                                                            
studies have focused on the ideological aspects of the ERM.   
14  Standard strategies of raising rural income include improving the productivity of main crops, 
diversifying agricultural production by introducing high-value cash crops, livestock, or dairy, 
exploring off-farm income opportunities, and migration (World Bank, 2007). 
15  I use the village border in 1940 in order to account for the mergers that took place during the 
study period. Cities (shi) (e.g., Kobe, Himeji, Amagasaki, Akashi, Nishinomiya, Sumoto, 
Harima, Ashiya, and Itami) are excluded, since they were beyond the scope of the ERM. No 
towns or villages that were selected for the ERM had been merged into cities by 1940. 9 
 
villages were selected for SSP during period 2, and another six were selected after period 2.   
 
3.2.  Determinants of program participation 
First, I investigated the determinants of selection for planning and a special subsidy for 
examining whether the characteristics of treated and non-treated villages differed. It is important 
to note that selection for the ERM was based on two phases of selection: each village first 
applied voluntarily (self-selection), and then these applicants were further selected by the 
prefecture.  
Table 1 presents the mean differences in pre-treatment village characteristics between the 
treated and non-treated villages. Panel A compares the pre-treatment means between PLAN1 
and non-PLAN1 in 1930; Panel B compares the pre-treatment means between PLAN2 and 
non-PLAN2 (conditional on being non-PLAN1) in 1935; and Panel C compares pre-treatment 
means between SSP and non-SSP (conditional on being PLAN1) in 1935.   
Panels A and B in Table 1 show that villages selected for planning were more likely to be 
rural and oriented to agriculture. I find that the non-treated villages tended to have larger 
populations; this is because some of the non-treated villages were located next to cities, such as 
Nishinomiya or Amagasaki, which had experienced significant in-migrations during this period. 
On the other hand, the treated villages tended to rely heavily on agriculture: these villages had a 
higher percentage of farm households, full-time farmers, owner–cultivators, and 
owner-cum-tenants than the non-treated villages. As for the outcome variables of interest, they 
do not significantly differ in terms of crop diversification; this implies that prior to selection, the 
villages were roughly on the same level before the selection. However, I did find that the 
percentage of farm households raising cattle was already higher for treated villages.   
Contrary to the selection process, Panel C indicates that SSP and non-SSP villages were 
more or less similar except for population and the number of households. This is probably 
because the sample (PLAN1 villages) had already been selected through participation in 
planning. In other words, the selection for SSP was not likely to be based on these observable 
characteristics.  
These observations can be confirmed using probit estimations, which regress the 
treatment indicators on various pre-treatment village characteristics (Table 2). The independent 
variables are the same as those for Table 1, except that I dropped the population and number of 10 
 
households because they are highly collinear, and the latter is represented by the number of farm 
households and its percentage among all households. Although the direction of a correlation 
between dependent and independent variables generally aligned with the observations in Table 1, 
most of the coefficients are not precisely estimated after controlling for other variables.   
In summary, it is likely that relatively agriculturally oriented villages were selected for 
the ERM. Unfortunately, due to a lack of data pertaining to program applications, I am unable to 
examine whether these villages were more likely to self-select for application or if the 
prefecture was selective in favoring these villages.   
 
3.3.  Effects on household income, expenditure, and debt 
Since the ultimate goal of the ERM was to prompt recovery from the Great Depression, 
we wish to see whether these impacts coincided with an increase in income or a reduction of 
debt. Unfortunately, no data in the Annual Statistics of Hyogo Prefecture reflected these 
outcomes; however, some data before and after the selection for treated villages are available 
through reports published by the Hyogo Prefecture. According to the Hyogo Prefecture (1937 a, 
b), which provided data for 10 villages that had been selected for planning, farm income had 
increased by an average of 399.91 yen before and after treatment, whereas expenditures had 
only increased by 180.42 yen, resulting in a net increase of 219.50 yen. As for debt, Hyogo 
Prefecture (1938) provided the data with respect to the change in savings and debt for the period 
between the year that the rehabilitation plan was established and October 1937 for the 114 
villages that had been selected for the ERM between 1932 and 1936. On average, these villages 
increased savings by 7 percentage points and decreased debt by 13.9 percentage points. These 
results are suggestive in that they demonstrate that the ERM had some positive outcomes on 
financial status at the household level. However, we should be aware that the evidence derived 
only from before-after comparisons; therefore, it could have suffered from selection bias. 
 
3.4.  Effects on diversification 
Here, I examine the effect of the ERM on the diversification of agricultural production 
and adoption of animal husbandry. As discussed in section 2.3, although the selected villages 
had been able to draft certain strategies or goals into their rehabilitation plans, these two 
outcomes seemed to be most realistic (and measurable) under certain social circumstances and 11 
 
whenever there was a lack of financial support needed to implement the plan. 
I measure the extent of production diversification by the following diversification index: 
       1 ∑  
   
∑      
 
 
   , 
where      is the area cultivated under crop   in village  . If      is close to 0, then it 
implies that production is concentrated in a few crops, whereas a     of close to 1 implies 
diversification. I use planted areas of rice, barley, wheat, naked barley, soybeans, azuki beans, 
sweet potato, potato, horse bean, cucumber, watermelon, eggplant, daikon radish, aroid, and 
onion to calculate this index. These crops are selected for this study owing to the following 
reasons: they occupied high shares of planted areas, they were cultivated in many villages, and 
longitudinal data for these crops were available for 1930, 1935, and 1940. Regarding the 
adoption of animal husbandry, I examine the percentage of farm households
16  that raised cattle, 
pigs, and horses
17. Whenever data are available, the percentage of part-time farmers is also 
considered in order to examine income diversification resulting from non-farm occupations.   
I adopt a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effect of the ERM, using the 
following regression model: 
 
Δ              1     1935         1     1940         2     1940 
																		       1             1940       1             1935   (1) 
																		       2     1935    Δ      1940   Δ     
 
where  Δ     is the change of outcomes for village   between years   5 and   and 
    1935,1940.      1  and     2  are indicator variables for whether a village was 
selected for planning in period 1 (1930–1934) or in period 2 (1935–1939), respectively, as 
depicted in Figure 2.      is a similar indicator variable for selection to SSP in period 2, and 
                                                      
16  The denominator is the number of farm households. However, for 1940, only the “number of 
rice-farming farm households” instead of “number of farm households” was reported. Thus, 
strictly speaking, the definition of the outcome with respect to the adoption of animal husbandry 
is not consistent across the three time periods examined. Alternatively, the number of 
households could be used as the denominator. The main results using this alternative outcome 
are mostly similar (results available on request).   
17  Many plans in fact specified cattle, cocoons, and chickens as the target livestock; horses were 
rarely mentioned. Unfortunately, the data for cocoons and chickens are not available throughout 
the three time points. 12 
 
 1935 and		 1940 are year dummies. Δ   is a vector of the change of time-variant village 
characteristics, namely, the number of households and farm households.
18  
Under this specification,  s measures the change of outcomes over time for treated 
villages, in the period after the selection, relative to the change in outcomes for villages that had 
never been selected, either for planning or for receiving a special subsidy (i.e., non-PLAN2 in 
Figure 2). For example,    is the difference in the change of outcomes from 1930 to 1935 
between villages selected for planning in period 1 (PLAN1) and those that had never been 
selected for the ERM (non-PLAN2). The coefficient of the interaction term     1          
(  ) is the additional effect of SSP for PLAN1 villages in period 2. This specification also 
measures pre-treatment trends with   s. For example      is the difference in the trends in period 
1 (pre-treatment trends) between PLAN2 villages and the never-treated.   
Panel A in Table 3 reports the results. Some coefficients are missing owing to a lack of 
outcome data for 1940. Selection for planning in period 1 (PLAN1) had a significant effect on 
the adoption of raising cattle and pigs in period 1
19. During period 1, the increase in the 
percentage of farm households raising cattle in PLAN1 villages was 3.13 percentage points 
more than that in never-treated villages; this accounted for a 5.7% increase
20 for PLAN1 
villages from 1930 to 1935. This effect, however, seemed to disappear in period 1; the effect is 
positive but not statistically significant for period 2. Moreover, in period 2, the percentage of 
farm households raising pigs in PLAN1 villages significantly declined. PLAN2 villages 
experienced a similar pattern during period 2; these villages adopted more cattle raising (i.e., a 
3.51 percentage-point increase or 6.5% increase in the ratio of farm households raising cattle), 
but the effect on the introduction of pig raising is negative. In addition to the effect on cattle 
raising, the coefficient of PLAN2*1940 for the diversification index is positive and significant 
(a 2.8% increase during 1935 to 1940), implying a successful diversification of production.   
The interaction term of PLAN1*SSP*1940 measures the additional effect of being 
                                                      
18  Unfortunately, other variables, such as the composition of farm households in terms of 
full-time vs. part-time, tenancy status, or farm size, are not available for 1940.   
19  Four villages are dropped from the estimation for the results regarding the adoption of animal 
husbandry either because the denominator (i.e., the number of rice-farming farm households) 
showed an abnormal trend or it is zero in 1940. 
20  The mean pre-treatment value of the percentage of households raising cattle for PLAN1 
villages in 1930 is 54.7%. Therefore, a 3.13 percentage-point increase accounts for a 3.13/54.5 
= 5.7% increase. 13 
 
selected for SSP in period 2, on top of the effect of the selection for planning in period 1. 
However, I do not find any statistically significant difference. I also find no effect on the 
adoption of horse raising and on the percentage of part-time farmers for any of the interaction 
terms (columns (4) and (5)). This could be because horse raising was not as popular in Hyogo 
and the increase of part-time farmers depended primarily on the distance to urban cities. The 
result in column (3) indicates that although some of the coefficients had are not precisely 
estimated, pig farming tended to decline in period 2. This seems to reflect the fact that the use of 
fodder was prioritized for feeding cows and horses following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese 
War in 1937 (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 1980). 
The interaction terms in italics (PLAN1*SSP*1935 and PLAN2*1935) measure the 
pre-treatment trends. I find that in terms of the diversification index, PLAN1 villages selected 
for SSP had performed better, even before selection (i.e., in period 1), than PLAN1 villages that 
had not been selected for SSP in period 2. Similarly, PLAN2 villages had already made more 
progress in terms of raising cattle and pigs than the never-treated villages, even before selection. 
These findings may imply that the selection for SSP or planning in period 2 was conditional on 
performance in period 1. On the other hand, it also raises concerns regarding selection bias, 
which is discussed next.   
 
3.5.  Robustness 
Here, I discuss two concerns that may have biased the estimates in Table 3. First, in 
section 3.2, I have discovered that the treated villages were more agriculturally oriented than the 
non-treated ones. Note that if we take the first difference, the time-invariant component of 
unobservable village characteristics is differenced out of the regression on the level of outcome, 
but the influence on the trend of outcome may still remain. This raises the concern that the 
change of outcomes might have been greater for agriculturally oriented villages, for example, 
because such villages have fewer choices over whether to intensify their agricultural practices. 
Although it is not possible to address these issues completely, I include one-period lagged 
values of key village characteristics in order to consider this concern.
21 The results thereof are 
reported in Table 4. The results are similar, except that the positive coefficient of PLAN2*1935 
                                                      
21  The controlled village characteristics are number of farm households, percentage of farm 
households to all households, percentages of full-time farmers, percentages of farm households 
by tenancy status, and percentages of farm households by farm-size class. 14 
 
for the adoption of cattle raising lost its statistical significance.   
The second concern is raised in Table 3, where the pre-treatment trend for the adoption 
of cattle was greater for PLAN2 than for non-PLAN2. This suggests that the coefficient of 
PLAN2*1940 for this outcome may have been overestimated because the change in period 2 
might have also been greater than the never-treated villages, even in the absence of treatment. 
(This concern is not true for the coefficient of PLAN2*1940 for the diversification index.) To 
address this concern, I follow the strategy proposed by Feder, Murgai, and Quizon (2003) in 
order to examine whether changes in outcomes during the period after selection were greater 
than changes in outcomes during the period prior to selection. That is, I perform the one-sided 
tests            (i.e., the coefficient of PLAN2*1940 is larger than the coefficient of 
PLAN2*1935) and        	 (i.e., the coefficient of PLAN1*SSP*1940 is larger than the 
coefficient of PLAN1*SSP*1935) against the null hypothesis that no difference exists between 
pre- and post-treatment trends. Panel B of Tables 3 and 4 indicate that although the trends 
pertaining to the diversification index and percentage of farm households raising cattle for 
period 2 are both greater than those for period 1 in PLAN2, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the trends are equal. This, however, seems to be affected by common shocks that might 
have slowed down the trend in period 2. First, the outbreak of World War II in 1937 increased 
controls and restrictions on agricultural production and economic activities. Second, inflation 
during period 2 increased agricultural incomes and reduced debt.   
Another related test is to include a village fixed effect in equation (1), in order to use the 
change of trend in period 2 relative to the trend in period 1 within each village. Table 5 provides 
the results. Since it is unlikely that trends vary during a short period of time, it is not surprising 
that many of the coefficients are not precisely estimated. The coefficients of the year 1940 
dummy measure the change of trends for the reference group, that is, never-treated villages. The 
coefficients indicate that the trend in period 2 was no different from that in period 1, except for 
the percentage of farm households raising cattle. The coefficients of the interaction terms 
measure the differences in the changes in trends, relative to the never-treated villages. Once 
again, although the coefficients of PLAN2*1940 for the diversification index and adoption of 
cattle are positive, none of the interaction terms are significantly positive; this is consistent with 
the hypothesis test in Panel B of Table 3. Thus, I cannot claim that the ERM accelerated the 
trends under examination; (the deceleration in the adoption of pig farming seems to reflect the 15 
 
effect of war, as indicated above). 
Overall, the results suggest that the villages that had been selected for planning 
experienced a greater change in terms of the adoption of cattle raising and crop diversification, 
in comparison to never-treated villages, during the post-selection period. However, the 
possibility that the effects of ERM are overestimated due to selection bias cannot be completely 
ruled out. It is known that the ERM was inspired by the pioneering “Self-Rehabilitation 
Movement” (Jiriki kosei undo) in Hyogo prefecture, which started in 1927. Shoji (1991) 
indicates that many of the villages that were ultimately selected for the ERM had already been 
selected for this Movement and conducted their own rural planning. Therefore, the results may 
have picked up the effects of this forerunning program. 
 
4.  Concluding remarks 
This paper studies the characteristics and economic effects of a rural development 
program in Japan during the 1930s. The program, called the rural ERM, was probably the 
earliest nationwide participatory development program; it had features similar to those of 
today’s community-driven development interventions. This paper represents the first 
quantitative examination of the determinants of program participation and its effect on 
economic outcomes. 
I find that relatively agriculturally oriented villages were more likely to participate in the 
program. Through the best use of the available historical data, I find suggestive evidence that 
households in the villages that had been selected for the program had improved their financial 
standings by reducing their debt. Moreover, the selected villages tended to adopt cattle raising 
and diversify agricultural production more actively than non-treated villages during the period 
following the establishment of their respective rehabilitation plans. These were the most feasible 
strategies for improving income, primarily by utilizing idle labor in the slack season. However, 
given that, for some subgroups, the pre-treatment trend was greater even before the treatment, 
the possibility that some of the results are overestimated could not be ruled out; this was likely 
due to the contaminating effects of a similar program that had been implemented prior to the 
ERM. Further rigorous study is required to establish a causal link between the ERM and the 
outcomes. 
This paper also discusses a number of interesting features that may be useful in the 16 
 
current implementation of rural development programs. For example, conducting a baseline 
survey through the hands of the villagers themselves seems to be effective in helping them to 
become more conscious of the problems that they face and allows them to be able to see the 
issues at hand with greater clarity. It is also interesting that many villages embraced an incentive 
scheme to promote the implementation of the established plan through tournament-like 
competition among communities. Contrary to the criticisms that a lack of budgetary support 
until the start of SSP may have prevented the movement from making any real impact, these 
features might have actually been effective in making real changes. 
We should bear in mind that the ERM program and the rehabilitation plans were 
multi-dimensional. Different villages might have had goals and strategies different from those 
this paper examines. For example, I find that SSP had no impact on crop diversification or the 
adoption of livestock-raising; however, subsidies had mostly been invested into infrastructure 
and land improvement, for which effects were likely to be realized only in the long run. 
Studying the impact of the program on other outcomes and on long-run consequences remains a 
subject for future study. 
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Table 1. Pre-treatment values of village characteristics 
 
Notes: See Figure 2 for definitions of PLAN1, PLAN2, and SSP. “Farm size class” is the percentage of farm households in the indicated farm size class. One 
cho is approximately 1 ha. Robust standard errors, indicated in parentheses, are clustered by county. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
non‐PLAN1 PLAN1 non‐PLAN2 PLAN2 non‐SSP SSP
Mean Mean Mean S.E. Mean Mean Mean S.E. Mean Mean Mean S.E.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Population 3990.12 3015.26 ‐974.9*** (250.9) 5167.00 3193.11 ‐1,974*** (612.4) 3198.59 2612.77 ‐585.8** (269.9)
Number of households 815.10 606.88 ‐208.2*** (51.61) 1063.36 643.47 ‐419.9*** (123.9) 645.16 532.65 ‐112.5** (53.30)
Number of farm households 454.22 468.87 14.65 (24.42) 437.27 456.29 19.02 (30.69) 474.91 418.62 ‐56.30 (35.63)
Farm household (%) 66.62 79.15 12.54*** (2.389) 55.65 75.65 20.00*** (3.182) 76.93 79.76 2.833 (2.812)
Full‐time farmers (%) 61.76 66.85 5.089* (2.875) 60.15 64.03 3.882 (2.713) 68.13 67.50 ‐0.634 (4.864)
Part‐time farmers (%) 38.24 33.15 ‐5.089* (2.875) 39.85 35.97 ‐3.882 (2.713) 31.87 32.50 0.634 (4.864)
Owner‐cultivator (%) 26.88 28.03 1.152 (1.775) 24.62 29.42 4.797*** (1.538) 28.28 26.05 ‐2.231 (2.147)
Owner‐cum‐tenant (%) 42.52 45.59 3.076* (1.775) 41.46 45.29 3.828 (2.241) 44.07 47.39 3.325 (2.746)
Tenant farmers (%) 30.60 26.37 ‐4.227*** (1.202) 33.92 25.30 ‐8.624*** (2.266) 27.65 26.56 ‐1.094 (2.674)
Farm size class: <0.5 cho (%) 44.72 38.91 ‐5.811** (2.239) 44.03 44.25 0.217 (3.016) 37.32 39.47 2.154 (3.459)
Farm size class: 0.5‐1 cho (%) 41.05 45.02 3.970** (1.848) 40.88 41.13 0.247 (2.132) 43.46 42.15 ‐1.315 (2.921)
Farm size class: 1‐2 cho (%) 13.31 15.11 1.808 (1.861) 14.21 13.57 ‐0.642 (1.861) 18.24 16.44 ‐1.795 (2.606)
Farm size class: >2 cho (%) 0.94 0.99 0.0544 (0.258) 0.87 1.05 0.176 (0.226) 0.98 1.94 0.957 (0.903)
Diversification index 0.55 0.54 ‐0.0164 (0.0156) 0.56 0.56 ‐0.00130 (0.0129) 0.56 0.53 ‐0.0255 (0.0184)
Farm households raising cattle (%) 47.59 54.48 6.893*** (2.004) 44.98 53.91 8.926** (3.330) 57.59 61.96 4.374 (4.409)
Farm households raising pigs (%) 0.62 0.84 0.219 (0.214) 1.82 2.48 0.658* (0.371) 3.83 4.02 0.190 (0.911)
Farm households raising horses (%) 4.35 2.95 ‐1.398** (0.602) 4.11 3.12 ‐0.983 (0.877) 2.92 2.10 ‐0.822 (0.797)
Panel A.  Panel B. Panel C.
PLAN1 vs. non‐PLAN1: Pre‐treatment values in 1930 PLAN2 vs. non‐PLAN2: Pre‐treatment values in 1935 SSP vs. non‐SSP: Pre‐treatment values in 1935
Difference Difference Difference20 
 
Table 2. Determinants of selection (probit estimates, marginal effects) 
 
Notes: Marginal effects reported. The dependent variables are indicator variables of selection. See Figure 2 for 
definitions of PLAN1, PLAN2, and SSP. Independent variables are pre-treatment values in 1930 for column 
(1) and 1935 for columns (2) and (3). One cho is approximately 1 ha. The reference categories are part-time 
farmers (%) for full-time farmers (%); tenant farmers (%) for owner-cultivators (%) and owner-cum-tenants 
(%); and farm size class <0.5 cho for farm size class. Robust standard errors, indicated in parentheses, are 




Number of farm households ‐3.35e‐05 ‐0.000120 ‐0.000591
(0.000100) (0.000142) (0.000458)
Farm households (%) 0.00458*** 0.00945*** 0.00382
(0.00114) (0.00158) (0.00366)
Full‐time farmers (%) ‐0.000155 ‐0.000991 ‐0.00245
(0.00114) (0.00222) (0.00328)
Owner‐cultivator (%) 0.000527 0.00533 ‐0.00465
(0.00189) (0.00334) (0.00544)
Owner‐cum‐tenant (%) 0.00145 0.00440 0.000801
(0.00157) (0.00343) (0.00503)
Farm size class: 0.5‐1 cho (%) 0.00149 ‐0.00425 ‐0.00181
(0.00160) (0.00355) (0.00673)
Farm size class: 1‐2 cho (%) ‐3.53e‐05 ‐0.00867** ‐0.0112**
(0.00193) (0.00433) (0.00452)
Farm size class: >2 cho (%) 0.00138 0.0252* 0.0339*
(0.00744) (0.0150) (0.0205)
Diversification index ‐0.0797 ‐0.244 ‐0.702
(0.257) (0.332) (0.733)
Farm households raising cattle (%) 0.00136 0.00363 0.00485
(0.000927) (0.00241) (0.00348)
Farm households raising pigs (%) 0.0198* 0.0158* 0.00394
(0.0103) (0.00816) (0.00728)






Observations 385 301 84
Pseudo R2 0.0819 0.178 0.130
Log likelihood ‐185.4 ‐171.3 ‐45.23
Selection for:21 
 
Table 3. Effect of the Economic Rehabilitation Movement (ERM)   
 
Notes: The dependent variables are the changes in indicated outcomes. See Figure 2 for definitions of PLAN1, 
PLAN2, and SSP. Interaction terms, indicated in italics, measure pre-treatment trends. All regressions include 
changes in village characteristics (number of households and number of farm households). Robust standard 
errors, in parentheses, are clustered by county. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The hypothesis test in 


















( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Panel A. Parameters
PLAN1*1935 ‐0.00783 3.125*** 1.958*** 0.642 ‐0.0630
(0.0107) (1.105) (0.472) (0.487) (2.862)
PLAN1*1940 0.00764 1.015 ‐1.894**
(0.0107) (1.270) (0.688)
PLAN2*1940 0.0155** 3.508*** ‐0.969*
(0.00669) (0.955) (0.504)
PLAN1*SSP*1940 0.0133 ‐1.924 ‐0.255
(0.00962) (1.657) (0.647)
PLAN1*SSP*1935 0.0317*** 0.522 ‐0.240 ‐0.250 ‐2.533
(0.0108) (2.318) (0.801) (0.468) (4.544)
PLAN2*1935 ‐0.000175 2.266** 0.788** 0.0950 ‐0.823
(0.00900) (0.924) (0.354) (0.285) (1.376)
Year = 1940 0.00517 3.137* ‐0.829
(0.0125) (1.833) (0.595)
Constant 0.00987 0.596 1.142*** ‐0.962** 0.269
(0.00803) (0.751) (0.298) (0.423) (1.237)
N 769 766 766 385 385
R2 0.029 0.207 0.116 0.043 0.017
Panel B. Hypothesis test (p‐values)
PLAN2*1940>PLAN2*1935 0.132 0.216 0.984
PLAN1*SSP*1940>PLAN1*SSP*1935 0.860 0.748 0.50522 
 
Table 4. Robustness: Controlling for lagged values of village characteristics 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are the changes in indicated outcomes. See Figure 2 for definitions of PLAN1, 
PLAN2, and SSP. See the main text for controlled village characteristics. Robust standard errors, indicated in 
parentheses, are clustered by county. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The hypothesis test in Panel B tests 


















( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Panel A. Parameters
PLAN1*1935 ‐0.00864 2.933** 2.205*** 0.164 0.0376
(0.0103) (1.124) (0.540) (0.374) (2.215)
PLAN1*1940 0.00756 0.00797 ‐1.726***
(0.0113) (1.404) (0.555)
PLAN2*1940 0.0165** 2.875** ‐0.655*
(0.00671) (1.133) (0.332)
PLAN1*SSP*1940 0.0127 ‐2.761 ‐0.0928
(0.00941) (1.841) (0.652)
PLAN1*SSP*1935 0.0305*** ‐0.333 ‐0.244 ‐0.275 ‐0.476
(0.0108) (2.473) (0.764) (0.465) (3.927)
PLAN2*1935 6.94e‐05 1.479 1.055** ‐0.420* 0.469
(0.00863) (1.114) (0.480) (0.223) (1.568)
Year = 1940 0.00277 4.479** ‐0.849
(0.0126) (1.766) (0.543)
Constant ‐0.00967 ‐2.067 1.699** ‐1.965 ‐10.73*
(0.0218) (2.978) (0.767) (1.872) (5.271)
N 770 766 766 385 385
R2 0.046 0.110 0.126 0.050 0.236
Panel B. Hypothesis test (p‐values)
PLAN2*1940>PLAN2*1935 0.123 0.221 0.984
PLAN1*SSP*1940>PLAN1*SSP*1935 0.851 0.729 0.45423 
 
Table 5. First-difference estimates with village fixed effects 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are the changes in indicated outcomes. See Figure 2 for definitions of PLAN1, 
PLAN2, and SSP. All regressions include village fixed effects. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are 












PLAN1*1940 0.0174 ‐3.040 ‐3.852***
(0.0196) (2.146) (0.995)
PLAN2*1940 0.0168 1.652 ‐1.715**
(0.0132) (1.864) (0.747)
PLAN1*SSP*1940 ‐0.0187 ‐1.908 0.00132
(0.0167) (4.079) (1.339)
Year=1940 0.00331 4.129** ‐0.827
(0.0121) (1.841) (0.555)
Constant 0.00950*** 2.318*** 1.853***
(0.00280) (0.521) (0.303)
N 770 766 766




Figure 1. Procedure for establishing a rehabilitation plan under the Economic Rehabilitation Movement 
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